Stampede Trucking and The Workers\u27 Compensation Fund of Utah v. John R. Kimball and The Industrial Commission of Utah : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
Stampede Trucking and The Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah v. John R. Kimball
and The Industrial Commission of Utah : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Alan L. Hennebold; Industrial Commission of Utah; Counsel for Respondents.
Carrie T. Taylor; Barbara W. Sharp; Workers Compensation Fund of Utah; James R. Black; Co-
Counsel for Petitioners.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Stampede, Inc v. Kimball, No. 950815 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/7044
mu UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
BRIEF 
<tenh\*.-fif* 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STAMPEDE TRUCKING and THE 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH, 
Petitioners/ 
vs , 
JOHN R. KIMBALL and THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Respondents. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Coni: t ID f App e a 1 s 9 5 0 815 - CA 
Priority 7 
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE ORDER 
OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION Of UTAH 
CARRIE T. TAYLOR 
BARBARA W, SHARP 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH 
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
JAMES R. BLACK 
349 SOUTH 200 EAST, SUITE 310 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONERS 
ALAN HENNEBOLD (4740) 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH 
16 0 EAST 3 00 SOUTH 
P.O. Box 146600 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84114-6600 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
^noeafs 
2 5 1996 
Branch 
^e Court 
LIST OF PARTIES 
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONS 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
KIMBALL 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CARRIE T. TAYLOR 
BARBARA W. SHARP 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH 
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
JAMES R. BLACK 
349 SOUTH 200 EAST, #310 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
T. JEFFERY COTTLE 
3 87 WEST CENTER 
OREM, UTAH 84057 
ALAN HENNEBOLD 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH 
P.O. BOX 146600 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84114-6600 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Authorities ii 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . 1 
Issue Presented For Review and Standard of Review 1 
Controlling Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Statement of the Case: 
Nature of the Case 2 
Proceedings Below . 2 
Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Summary of Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
POINT ONE: The Commissions Rule R568-1-4.J. is 
consistent with the Workers' Compensation Act and 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 7 
POINT TWO: Stampede violated Rule R568-1-4.J 8 
POINT THREE: Stampede has failed to show that the 
Commission violated its past practice by excluding 
Dr. Knorpp's report from evidence 9 
POINT FOUR: The Commission's application of Rule 
R568-1-4.J. was reasonable and rational under the 
circumstances of this case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
POINT FIVE: Stampede's failure to comply with 
Rule R568-1-4.J. was properly before the Commission . . 12 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
Certificate of Service. . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
APPENDIX 
Exhibit A: Decision of the Administrative Law Judge 
Exhibit B: Decision of the Industrial Commission 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES CITED: 
Ashcroft v. Industrial Com'n, 
855 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993) 1 
Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309, 
311 (Utah App. 1992) 12 
Spencer v. Industrial Com'n, 81 Utah 511, 
20 P.2d 618 (Utah 1933) 7 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-1 et seq. (1994 Replacement) 2 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-88 (1994 Replacement) 7,8,12 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-l et seq., (1993) 7 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (4) (h) (1993 Replacement) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1995 Supp.) 1 
RULES: 
Rule R568-1-4.J, Utah Admin. Code . . 1,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 
ii 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
petition for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(12) 
(1994), Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(1) (1993) and Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(a) (1995 Supp.). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the Commission err in its application of Rule 
R568-1-4.J. by refusing to accept Dr. Knorpp's medical report as 
evidence on Kimball's claim for workers' compensation benefits? 
Standard of review: The Court of Appeals will review the 
Commission's application of the Commission's Rule R568-1-4.J. 
under the standard of "reasonableness and rationality". Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) (1993); Ashcroft v. Industrial 
Com'n, 855 P.2d 267, 269 (Utah App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE RULE 
The Commission's Rule R568-1-4.J provides as follows: 
All medical records shall be filed by the 
employer or its insurance carrier as a single joint 
exhibit at least one week before the scheduled 
hearing. Claimant must cooperate and submit all 
pertinent medical records contained in his file to the 
employer or its insurance carrier for the joint 
exhibit submission two weeks in advance of a scheduled 
hearing. Exhibits are to be placed in an indexed 
binder arranged by care provider in chronological 
order. Exhibits should include all relevant treatment 
records with the exception of hospital nurses notes. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This proceeding arises from Kimball's 
claim against Stampede for medical benefits and temporary total 
disability compensation pursuant to the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-1 et seq. ("the Act"). 
The ALJ and the Commission granted Kimball's claim. Stampede 
then sought review by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Proceedings Below: Kimball filed an application for hearing 
with the Commission, claiming medical expenses and temporary 
total disability compensation for injuries suffered while 
working for Stampede on March 15, 1993. (R.2) 
An ALJ conducted an evidentiary hearing on Kimball's claim. 
At the hearing, Stampede presented Dr. Knorpp's report, which 
disputed the necessity of the medical treatment Kimball had 
received. (R. 477) The ALJ excluded Dr. Knorpp's report from 
evidence for two reasons: 1) The report lacked foundation; and 
2) The report was a second independent medical examination 
("IME") and as such, violated Commission rules regarding IMEs. 
(R. 266) 
Based on the other evidence which was admitted at the 
hearing, the ALJ granted Kimball's claim for benefits. (R. 26 8, 
269; the ALJ's decision is attached as Exhibit A.) Stampede 
filed a motion for review with the Commission. (R. 271) The 
Commission affirmed the ALJ's exclusion of Dr. Knorpp's report, 
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but for reasons different from those cited by the ALJ. (R. 364, 
Exhibit B.) Stampede filed a request for reconsideration (R. 
372), which the Commission denied. (R. 469) 
Stampede then petitioned the Court of Appeals for review of 
the Commission's decision. 
Facts: On March 15, 1993, Kimball was in a traffic 
accident while working for Stampede. (R. 1) Stampede paid 
Kimball's medical expenses as well as temporary total disability 
compensation from March 16 through July 22, 1993. (R.9) He 
returned to work during late July, 1993. (R. 257) 
Several months later, Kimball began suffering severe 
headaches. (R. 257, 258) During July 1994, on instruction from 
his physician, Kimball left work and received further medical 
treatment. (R. 49) Kimball then requested additional workers' 
compensation benefits from Stampede on the theory that his 
continuing medical complaints were caused by his prior 
industrial accident. Kimball's claim was supported by the 
medical opinion of his treating physician. (R. 84, R. 98) 
Despite the various medical opinions supporting Kimball's 
claim, Stampede denied Kimball's request for additional workers' 
compensation benefits. (R. 9, 10) Stampede also employed Dr. 
Yelton to perform an IME of Kimball. (R. 6) In the meantime, 
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Kimball filed an application for hearing with the Commission to 
compel Stampede to pay his medical expenses and temporary total 
disability compensation. (R. 2) 
On October 5, 1994, Dr. Yelton submitted his report to 
Stampede. Dr. Yelton agreed with the medical opinions of 
Kimball's treating physicians that Kimball's continuing medical 
problems were due to his industrial accident. Dr. Yelton also 
concluded that Kimball's continuing medical care was reasonably 
necessary. (R. 38-40) 
On November 1, 1994, the Commission's Adjudication Division 
instructed Stampede to answer Kimball's application for hearing. 
(R. 7,8) Stampede answered on November 14, 1994, generally 
denying liability. (R. 9-13) On January 3, 1995, the 
Adjudication Division set the matter for a formal evidentiary 
hearing to be held on March 7, 1995. (R. 14) 
On February 20, 1995, Kimball requested that Stampede 
provide him with a copy of the complete medical record 
pertaining to Kimball's claim. (Respondent Kimball's brief, page 
9.) On February 22, 1995, Stampede mailed a copy of the medical 
record to Kimball. In its cover letter, Stampede represented 
that the record was complete except for "updates from a couple 
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of providers''. (Petitioner Kimball's brief, Appendix B) 
Stampede's letter did not disclose that Stampede intended to 
obtain and submit Dr. Knorpp's evaluation of Kimball's claim. 
On February 27, 1995, nearly two months after the 
Adjudication Division had scheduled the evidentiary hearing and 
only 10 days before the date of the hearing, Stampede employed 
Dr. Knorpp to submit his evaluation of the medical necessity of 
Kimball's treatment. (R. 273) Dr. Knorpp's report was not 
submitted to Kimball's attorney until late in the afternoon of 
March 6, 1995, the day before the evidentiary hearing nor was 
the report included in the medical exhibit that Stampede 
compiled pursuant to Rule R568-1-4.J. (R. 477) Dr. Knorpp's 
report was not submitted to the ALJ until after the evidentiary 
hearing had commenced. (R. 477) 
Kimball borrowed money in order to travel from Indiana to 
Utah for the evidentiF?~y hearing. (R.555) At no time did 
Stampede request a continuance of the evidentiary hearing so 
that Dr. Knorpp's report could be included in the medical 
records and submitted to Kimball and the ALJ in conformity with 
Rule R568-1-4.J. 
The ALJ refused to accept Dr. Knorpp's report on the 
grounds it lacked foundation and contravened Industrial 
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Commission rules. (R. 265-268) Based on the evidence that was 
admitted at the evidentiary hearing, the ALJ concluded that no 
medical controversy existed which required referral of Kimball's 
claim to a medical panel and that Kimball was entitled to the 
requested medical expenses and temporary total disability 
compensation. (R. 268) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rule R568-1-4.J. required Stampede to submit all medical 
records to the ALJ and Kimball's counsel at least one week prior 
to the evidentiary hearing. Although Stampede had two months' 
advance notice of the date of hearing, Stampede did not submit 
Dr. Knorpp's report until the day of the hearing. Even when it 
was obvious to Stampede that Dr. Knorpp's report would not be 
available in time to properly submit it as part of the medical 
record, Stampede did not request a continuance of the hearing. 
The purpose of Rule R568-1-4.J. is to allow all parties and 
the ALJ an opportunity to evaluate the medical evidence in 
advance of the evidentiary hearing and to avoid unfair surprise. 
The rule results in speedier adjudication of injured workers' 
claims and reduces the costs of litigation to all parties. By 
refusing to condone Stampede's violation of the rule, the 
Commission acted reasonably and rationally to protect the 
efficiency and integrity of the hearing process. 
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POINT ONE: THE COMMISSION'S RULE R568-1-4.J. IS 
CONSISTENT WITH THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT AND THE 
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT. 
The Commission is authorized to conduct its proceedings "in 
such a manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain 
the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly 
the spirit of the Workers' Compensation Act." Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-88 (1994); emphasis added. The Commission is granted 
broad discretion with respect to the manner in which it conducts 
its investigations. Unless a party shows the deprivation of 
some substantial right, the appellate courts will not interfere 
with the Commission's conduct of its hearings. Spencer v. 
Industrial Com'n. 81 Utah 511, 20 P.2d 618 (Utah 1933). 
Likewise, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-l et seq., (1993) ("UAPA") acknowledges the ability 
of agencies such as the Commission to promulgate rules 
"affecting or governing adjudicative proceedings" provided such 
rules conform to the requirements of UAPA. 
Pursuant to the foregoing authority, the Commission has 
promulgated Rule R568-1-4.J. The rule requires that " (a)11 
medical records shall be filed by the employer or its insurance 
carrier as a single joint exhibit at least one week before the 
scheduled hearing." (Emphasis added.) 
The purpose of Rule R568-1-4.J. is to insure that the 
medical evidence which is critically important in workers' 
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compensation claims is available to the parties and the ALJ 
prior to the evidentiary hearing. The rule provides an 
efficient means of disclosure of evidence while preventing 
unfair surprise. Full disclosure of medical evidence 
facilitates voluntary settlement. In cases that are not 
settled, the rule allows the evidentiary hearing to focus on the 
precise points of dispute. As a result, adjudication of 
workers' compensation claims is speedy and economical, in 
keeping with the legislature's admonition to the Commission in 
§88 of the Act "to ascertain the substantial rights of the 
parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the Workers' 
Compensation Act." 
POINT TWO: STAMPEDE VIOLATED RULE R568-1-4.J. 
By its plain language, Rule R568-1-4.J. is mandatory. It 
requires the defendant, in this case Stampede, to submit all 
medical records to the applicant and the ALJ at least one week 
prior to the evidentiary hearing. 
On January 3, 1995, the Commission's Adjudication Division 
notified Stampede that the evidentiary hearing on Kimball's 
claim would be held on March 7, 199 5. (R.14) By January 3, 
1995, Stampede had already received the report from its own 
doctor, Dr. Yelton. Dr. Yelton agreed with Kimball's treating 
physicians that Kimball's medical treatment and continuing 
disability were due to his industrial accident. (R.38-40) 
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Therefore, on January 3, 199 5, Stampede knew that it had no 
medical evidence to support its denial of Kimball's claim. 
For the next seven weeks, Stampede did nothing to obtain 
the medical evidence it required. Then, on February 27, 1995, 
one week prior to the hearing, Stampede retained Dr. Knorpp to 
evaluate Kimball's medical condition and treatment. (R.27 3) Dr. 
Knorpp mailed his report to Stampede on March 3, 1995. Stampede 
in turn faxed the report to Kimball's attorney on the eve of the 
evidentiary hearing. Stampede did not submit the report to the 
ALJ until the evidentiary hearing had commenced on March 7, 
1995. (R. 477.) 
The foregoing facts establish that Stampede violated the 
mandatory requirements of the Commission's Rule R568-1-4.J. 
POINT THREE: STAMPEDE HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE 
COMMISSION VIOLATED ITS PAST PRACTICE BY EXCLUDING DR. 
KNORPP#S REPORT FROM EVIDENCE. 
At page 1 of its brief, Stampede notes that "appellate 
review of whether an agency action is contrary to the agency's 
prior practice first requires a petitioner to establish a prima 
facie case that his or her case was contrary to prior practice, 
. . . . (emphasis added; citations omitted) 
The Commission agrees with the foregoing statement. 
Stampede must prove the Commission deviated from prior practice 
when it refused to admit Dr. Knorpp's report. However, Stampede 
has made no effort to prove that point. Stampede has not 
identified any other prior case where the Commission has applied 
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Rule R568-1-4.J. differently than it was applied in this case. 
Consequently, Stampede has failed to meet its threshold burden 
of showing that the Commission has decided this case contrary to 
past practice. 
POINT FOUR: THE COMMISSION'S APPLICATION OF RULE 
R568-1-4.J. WAS REASONABLE AND RATIONAL UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
Stampede sets forth a number of complaints regarding the 
Commission's application of Rule R568-1-4.J. First, Stampede 
argues it is unfair for the Commission to exclude Dr. Knorpp's 
report while permitting other medical records to be submitted 
after the evidentiary hearing. However, neither the parties nor 
the ALJ objected to the late admission of such other medical 
records. In contrast, both the ALJ and Kimball raised 
objections to Dr. Knorpp's report and the report was excluded 
from evidence. 
Stampede also argues that under the Commission's 
application of Rule R568-1-4.J., "(e)ither party can 
unilaterally and arbitrarily prevent admission of essential 
medical evidence simply by refusing to stipulate to its 
submission less than seven days before the hearing." (Stampede's 
brief, page 16.) 
The answer to Stampede's concern is simple. If Stampede 
submits its medical exhibit within the time limits of Rule R56 8-
1-4. J, there is no need to stipulate to submission and, 
therefore, no opportunity for "arbitrary" exclusion of evidence. 
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Next, Stampede contends the Commission's suggestion that 
Stampede should have requested a continuance "would certainly 
have caused undue hardship on Kimball, who had traveled from 
Indiana, . . . to say nothing of the burden on the Commission's 
administrative system." The Commission did not mean to suggest 
that it would have been reasonable for Stampede to wait until 
the evidentiary hearing to request a continuance. Any such 
request should and could have been made earlier. 
By January 3, 199 5, Stampede knew that it faced an 
evidentiary hearing on March 7, 1995. It also knew it had no 
medical evidence to support its position. Under such 
circumstances, Stampede could have taken prompt action to obtain 
the medical evidence or requested a continuance well in advance 
of the hearing. If Stampede had made a timely request for 
continuance, Kimball would not have been forced to borrow money 
to travel to Utah and the ALJ could have adjusted her hearing 
calendar accordingly. 
Finally, Stampede claims the Commission "summarily 
dismissed" its defenses to Kimball's claim. That 
characterization of the Commission's action is incorrect. The 
Commission considered the admissibility of Dr. Knorpp's report 
and rejected the report as untimely under Rule R568-1-4.J. The 
Commission then considered the merits of Kimball's claim and 
ruled in his favor. There was no summary disposition in this 
case. 
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POINT FIVE: STAMPEDE'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 
R5 6 8 -1-4.J. WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION. 
Stampede contends that Kimball waived any objection he 
might have made pursuant to Rule R568-1-4.J. to Dr. Knorpp's 
report. The Commission agrees with Kimball's reply, set forth 
as Point V.B of Kimball's brief. However, the Commission wishes 
to make an additional comment on the issue. 
As a general principle, the Court of Appeals "will not 
reverse a trial court's determination on the admissibility of 
evidence absent an abuse of discretion impacting a party's 
substantial rights." Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P. 2d 309, 311 (Utah 
App. 1992). In workers' compensation cases, the above-stated 
rule of deference has statutory underpinnings. As previously 
noted, §35-1-88 of the Act authorizes the Commission to conduct 
its proceedings in "such a manner as in its judgment is best 
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties 
and to carry out justly the spirit of the Workers' Compensation 
Act. " 
The Commission has an independent statutory duty to insure 
that the adjudicatory process is fair to all parties and serves 
the purposes of the workers' compensation system. Whether or 
not Kimball relied upon Rule R568-1-4.J. in opposing the 
admission of Dr. Kimball's report, the Commission was entitled 
to enforce its own the rule. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Utah legislature has directed the Commission to use its 
judgment in conducting workers' compensation proceedings in a 
manner that is fair to the parties and serves the purposes of 
the workers' compensation system. To that end, the Commission 
promulgated Rule R568-1-4.J. to insure that all parties will 
have advance knowledge of medical evidence. The Commission's 
application of its Rule R568-1-4.J. is entitled to deference, so 
long as it is within the limits of reason and rationality. 
Stampede failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 
R568-1-4.J. It also failed to show any reasonable excuse for 
its noncompliance. Finally, Stampede has failed to show that 
the Commission's action in this matter deviates from past 
practice. The Commission therefore respectfully requests the 
Court of Appeals to affirm the Commission's decision. 
Dated this 25th day of July, 1996. 
A^-U-UX 
Alan Hennebold 
General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
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Exhibit A 
ALJ'S DECISION 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 94-967 
JOHN R. KIMBALL, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
STAMPEDE TRUCKING/WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
« * * * * I A A J * * A r * * 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES; 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on March 
7, 1995 at 10:00 o'clock a.m. Said hearing was 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and was represented by T. 
Jeffery Cottle, Attorney. 
The defendants were represented by Carrie Taylor, 
Attorney. 
This case involves a claim for additional temporary total 
compensation and medical expenses related to a work-related March 
15, 1993 motor vehicle accident. The carrier initially accepted 
liability and paid temporary total compensation (at $367.00/week, 
totaling $3,077.57) and medical expenses from March 16, 1993 
through July 22, 1993. Thereafter, the applicant returned to work 
and worked through July 22, 1994. At that time, the applicant was 
taken off work by his treating physician, due to neck and upper 
back symptoms similar to what he had had during 1993, after the 
industrial motor vehicle accident. The applicant remained off work 
from July 22, 1994 until the date of hearing, and received medical 
care during that period of time. At the hearing, the applicant 
indicated that he had not yet been released to return to work by 
his physician and was continuing with medical care related to the 
industrial motor vehicle accident. The applicant claims additional 
temporary total compensation from July 22, 1994, the date that he 
began his off-work status again, through the date of hearing, and 
continuing until he becomes medically stable. The applicant also 
claims additional medical expenses for additional treatment 
reinstituted on July 22, 1994, related to neck and upper back pain 
associated with headaches. 
t r-o 
ORDER 
RE: JOHN R. KIMBALL 
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The carrier denies that the applicant is entitled to 
additional temporary total compensation and medical expenses, 
because his treating physician, Dr. T. Fenwick, released him to 
return to work in July of 1993 and found him medically stable in 
October of 1993. In addition, the carrier cites a medical report 
prepared by a Dr. S. Knorpp, a physician chosen by the carrier to 
review the applicant's medical records and answer specific 
questions, which indicates that most of the treatment after July of 
1994 was either unnecessary or unrelated to the March 15, 1993 
industrial motor vehicle accident, and which indicates that the 
applicant was not disabled after July of 1994. The carrier 
indicates that it believes that the applicant sought out the 
additional medical care and time off work in order to increase his 
special damages for a third party law suit that he is pursuing 
against the insurance carrier for the driver of the vehicle that 
struck him on March 15, 1993. The carrier points out that the 
applicant was able to return to his regular work shortly following 
the industrial accident and was able to continue working for a full 
year thereafter. Based on this history, the motivation to increase 
his recovery in his third party action, and the opinions of Dr. S. 
Knorpp, the carrier contends that the additional treatment and time 
off work is unrelated to the industrial motor vehicle accident of 
March 15, 1993. 
The applicant responds to the carrier's denial, indicating 
that the opinion of Dr. S. Knorpp should not be admissable, due to 
procedural concerns, and because Dr. Knorpp never examined him. 
The applicant states that, in October of 1994, the carrier actually 
arranged for him to see a physician of its choice, Dr. J. Yelton, 
in Indiana, where he now resides. Dr. Yelton examined him and 
reviewed his treatment and progress since the date of injury. Dr. 
Yelton specifies in his report to the carrier that the treatment 
that the applicant had been receiving since July of 1994 was 
reasonable and was related to the March 15, 1993 industrial 
accident. The applicant argues that the carrier was not happy with 
the conclusions of Dr. Yelton, its own chosen physician, and sought 
out another opinion from Dr. Knorpp, just prior to the hearing. 
The applicant argues that the Industrial Commission rules do not 
allow the carrier to obtain an unlimited number of different 
medical opinions in an attempt to find one that will support its 
position that no further treatment or benefits are reasonable. The 
applicant argues that the carrier chose its physician for offering 
a second opinion when it requested him to see Dr. Yelton and that 
the carrier should be required to abide by Dr. Yelton's 
recommendations, rather than the after-acquired opinion of Dr. 
Knorpp. The applicant argues that Dr. Knorpp's opinion should also 
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be dismissed, because it is not properly founded. The applicant 
points out that Dr. Knorpp merely reviewed his medical records and 
did no phyisical examination of him. The applicant argues that Dr. 
Knorpp cannot offer a reliable opinion about what treatment is, or 
is not, warranted, without examining him to see what his condition 
is. 
The carrier argued at hearing that it is now clear, based 
on the opinions of the treating physician, Dr. Yelton and Dr. 
Knorpp, that there is a significant medical controversy regarding 
the relatedness and the medical necessity of the treatment and time 
off work since July 1994 and that, as a result, the ALJ should 
refer the dispute to a medical panel for additional input on this 
contested issue. The carrier indicated at hearing that it would 
have preferred to have the applicant examined by Dr. Knorpp, rather 
than have Dr. Knorpp merely do a file review, but cost containment 
concerns prevented it from paying to have the applicant come to 
Utah for such an examination. The carrier argued that the carrier 
itself did not choose Dr. Yelton for the initial second-opinion 
evaluation and that this choice was made by an third pary 
vocational rehabilitation firm, Intracorp, that had been hired by 
the carrier. The carrier argued at hearing that Intracorp did a 
poor selection in choosing Dr. Yelton to perform the second-opinion 
evaluation, as Dr. Yelton turns out to have the same philosophy 
regarding extended treatment as does the applicant's treating 
physician. Based on Dr. Knorpp's preferred opinion, the carrier 
has denied additional temporary total compensation beginning in 
July of.1994, has denied payment on all prescription medication 
except anti-depressants (amitrytilline), has denied payment on 
physical therapy offered beginning in July of 1994, has denied 
payment for diagnostic studies including a head CT, a brain MRI, an 
EEG, EMG/nerve conduction velocity testing, and sleep studies, all 
accomplished after July of 1994, and has denied payment for all but 
3 series of trigger point injections begun in August of 1994. 
Updated medical records were received post-hearing, on March 
22, 1995, and the matter was considered ready for order at that 
time. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant was hired by Stampede Trucking to work as a 
long-haul semi-truck driver in July of 1992. The applicant 
apparently concedes that the prior compensation rate paid to him by 
the carrier ($167.00/week) is accurately computed based on his 
average weekly wage while employed by Stampede Trucking. Per 
stipulation of the attorneys at hearing, the facts regarding his 
March 15, 1993 industrial motor vehicle accident are accurately 
reflected in a transcript of the recorded statement that the 
applicant gave to the carrier on December 6, 1994. That statement 
indicates that the applicant was proceeding through an intersection 
in Florida on March 15, 1993 when he was broadsided by a Suburban 
pulling a 30-foot trailor. The Suburban struck his vehicle at the 
rear axels of his tractor. The applicant indicates in his 
statement that he was wearing a seat belt at the time, without a 
shoulder harness. As a result of being struck by the Suburban, the 
applicant recalls having his head snapped around to the left and he 
recalls slamming his left knee into the the window crank. Per the 
recorded statement, the applicant was just 10 miles away from the 
site where he was to deliver his load when the accident occurred. 
After the accident, the applicant found that his vehicle was 
driveable, but only at about 25 miles per hour. He drove the 
vehicle to the delivery site and then had another driver who had 
been following him give him- a ride to the emergency room. 
Per the medical records admitted at hearing (Exhibit D-l), 
the applicant was seen at the Mid-Florida Health Center emergency 
room in Haines City, Florida, on the same day as the accident, with 
complaints of low back pain, upper back pain and neck pain. X-rays 
were taken of the cervical spine and the left knee. The cervical 
spine X-ray was read to show mild chronic changes at C6, with 
minimal lipping and the left knee X-ray was read as normal. The 
diagnostic impression is listed as cervical strain and left knee 
strain and the applicant was advised to follow-up with a doctor as 
soon as possible, when he got back home to Indiana. The applicant 
did not immediately return to Indiana at that time, but instead 
stayed in Florida at a motel, while his semi-truck tractor was 
being repaired. Per the recorded statement, the applicant just 
laid in bed at the motel for the next 10 days or so, until the 
truck was ready to drive. When it was repaired, he drove it back 
to Indiana, but the applicant stated that it took him 4 days to 
make the 900-mile trip, because he was able to drive only 1 to 1% 
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hours at a time. The applicant stated his driving limitation was 
due to pain at the base of his neck, at the top of his shoulder, 
between his shoulder blades and in the left knee. 
When the applicant got back to Indiana, he was seen at the 
Medical Center of Vincennes, in Vincennes, Indiana, on March 28, 
1993, apparently by a Dr. Hedde. The handwritten office note for 
this visit indicates that the applicant was complaining of pain 
between the shoulder blades, in the neck and in the left knee. Some 
aching and popping in the neck is noted and the office note 
reflects that the applicant was having problems with lifting 
things. A cervical muscle strain and left knee strain were 
diagnosed and the applicant was prescribed robaxin (muscle relaxer) 
and darvocet (pain medication). Dr. Hedde followed up with the 
applicant on April 6, 1993 and noted that the applicant did not 
feel much better. At that time, he referred the applicant on to an 
orthopedist, Dr. T. Fenwick of the Vincennes Orthopedic Surgery 
Clinic. Thereafter, Dr. Hedde apparently did refill the 
applicant's darvocet prescription several times. 
The applicant fist saw Dr. Fenwick on April 8, 1993. Dr. 
Fenwick noted left knee symptoms and a prior arthroscopic 
menisectomy in 1986. With respect to the neck and upper back, he 
noted cervical spine pain at the base of the neck, with popping and 
limitation of range of motion, as well as pain between the shoulder 
blades. He diagnosed myofacial strain of the neck and upper back 
with a left knee contusion causing a traumatic chondromalacia 
lesion. He referred the applicant for physical therapy to the neck 
and upper back and for knee exercises. He also took the applicant 
off work and prescribed darvocet and tylenol. The applicant had 8 
physical therapy treatments in April, apparently consisting of 
passive modalities (apparently primarily ultrasound) with no relief 
to the cervical and thoracic spine. Due to continued symptoms in 
the left knee, Dr. Fenwick referred the applicant to Good Samaritan 
Hospital in Vincennes on April 27, 1993 for an MRI of the left 
knee. This was read to show no evidence of a meniscal tear, but 
some thinning of the articular cartilage of the patella. 
During May of 1993, the applicant saw Dr. Fenwick twice (on 
May 13, 1993 and on May 20, 1993) and got 11 physical therapy 
treatments. The physical therapy apparently still consisted of 
passive modality treatment and little if any improvement was noted. 
Dr. Fenwick decided that it was going to take some time for the 
applicant to heal and felt that he needed to be in "real good 
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shape" to return to his truck driving, as it required the applicant 
to work with heavy tarps. He therefore had the applicant continue 
with physical therapy and did not see the applicant again until 
July 8, 1993. The applicant got 14 physical therapy treatments in 
June of 1993 and 9 treatments in July of 1993. The physical 
therapy notes reflect up and down improvement of the applicants 
symptoms, but no real lasting steady improvement. Nonetheless, 
when Dr. Fenwick saw the applicant on July 8, 1993, Dr. Fenwick 
noted that he thought that the applicant's neck was much better. 
Pain between the shoulder blades was noted to still exist, but with 
improvement. Some left knee symptoms remained and Dr. Fenwick 
decided to have the exercise weights boosted to assist with this. 
Dr. Fenwick noted that it was his impression that the physical 
therapy was really helping. On July 13, 1993, Dr. Fenwick wrote 
the carrier and indicated that he thought that the applicant was 
much improved, that his residual neck soreness was expected to 
improve within the next 2 weeks and that he anticipted a release to 
return to work around that time. Dr. Fenwick released the 
applicant to return to work on July 22, 1993 and indicated that the 
applicant should return for follow-up in 6 weeks. 
The carrier paid for all of Dr. Fenwick's 1993 treatment and 
for the applicant's time off work from March through July of 1993. 
The applicant did return to his same job with Stampede Trucking in 
late July of 1993. However, the applicant indicates in his 
recorded statement that he did not feel that Dr. Fenwick's 
treatment or the physical therapy improved his condition. He 
indicates in that statement that he requested to be released to 
return to work, but still had constant pain in his neck and upper 
back, along with headaches, when he returned to work in late July 
or early August of 1993. He recalls that Dr. Fenwick advised him 
not to work on flatbed trailors (apparently due to load maintenance 
responsibilities on these trailors) and advised him not to lift 
over 50 pounds on a permanent basis. As a result, the applicant 
states that he drove only tanker trailors when he returned to work. 
He stated that he actually performed truck driving with Stampede, 
or leased to another company, through April 15, 1994, when he quit 
driving truck, because of a wage dispute with Stampede and because 
of back pain and headaches. 
The applicant did follow-up with Dr. Fenwick in October of 
1993, and at that time. Dr. Fenwick noted continued symptoms in the 
knee, at the base of the neck and between the shoulder, blades, all 
of which he felt were aggravated by long hours driving truck. 
Nevertheless, Dr. Fenwick notes that, at that time, he felt the 
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applicant had reached maximum medical improvement. Also in October 
1993, the applicant began seeing Dr. J. Rohrer, D.O. for a sinus 
infection and accompanying headaches. X-rays of the sinuses and a 
CT of the head done at Good Samaritan Hospital, in October of 1993, 
at Dr. Rohrer's referral, were read as unremarkable. Dr. Rohrer 
tried a number of medications to treat the infection, including 
beconase and prednisone. He also prescribed darvocet, apparently 
for the headaches. In late October of 1993, he referred the 
applicant to Dr. Bizal, at the Tri-State Otolaryngology clinic in 
Evansville, Indiana. Dr. Bizal noted that the applicant smoked and 
had a high caffeine intake. He recommended decreased smoking and 
caffeine intake, both of which he felt might be contributing to the 
development of migraine headaches and sinusitis. From November of 
1993 through early July of 1994, Dr. Rohrer was the applicant's 
only treating physician, per the medical record exhibit. During 
this period of time, it is unclear how often Dr. Rohrer actually 
saw the applicant. His records reflect regular prescription 
refills, for the most part for hismanal (apparently an anti-
histimine), beconase AQ and darvocet. 
As noted above, the applicant quit truck driving in April 
of 1994 and started working as a sales representative for home 
cleaning system. This job required transporting and demonstrating 
equipment weighing around 30 pounds. The applicant did this 
through July of 1994, although he began seeing Dr. Fenwick again in 
mid-July of 1994. At that time, Dr. Fenwick noted that the 
applicant had recurrence of neck and lower cervical problems, along 
with pain in between the shoulder blades, the same as when Dr. 
Fenwick first saw the applicant in April of 1993. Dr. Fenwick 
notes that the applicant indicated that he never got completely 
well previously. Dr. Fenwick referred the applicant back to 
physical therapy, for hot packs and ultrasound treatment, 
anticpating following up with the applicant in 3 weeks. The 
applicant got 5 treatments in between July 11, 1994 and July 22, 
1994, with no improvement noted by the therapist. On July 22, 
1994, the applicant called Dr. Fenwick's office complaining of a 
severe headache. He was prescribed darvocet, toradol and flexeril 
at that time and was also advised to call Dr. Rohrer's office. The 
applicant did call Dr. Rohrer's office and Dr. Rohrer added imetrix 
to the prescribed medications. Later that day, the applicant was 
seen at the Good Samaritan Hospital ER for his headache. The ER 
note indicates that the applicant had been having headaches for one 
year and that other symptoms included alot of tension and sinus 
headaches. It was noted that the applicant had taken 6 darvocet, 
1 imetrix and had gone to physical therapy for hot packs and 
ultrasound that day, but still had the severe headache. The 
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applicant was treated with IV compazine, nubain and stadol and was 
improved upon release, per the ER records. The applicants 
recorded statement reflects that this trip to the ER is what caused 
him to discontinue working as a door-to-door sales representative. 
When the applicant saw Dr. Fenwick again on July 25, 1994, 
Dr. Fenwick noted the ER visit and opined that the applicant'& 
muscular tension headaches might be related to his back and upper 
shoulder pain. He decided to continue with the physical therapy 
modalities and noted that he anticipated a referral for trigger 
point injection therapy if the physical therapy did not improve the 
applicant's condition. In his recorded statement, the applicant 
indicates that the headaches that he was having in July of 1994 
were not the same kind of headaches that Dr. Rohrer was treating 
beginning in late 1993. The statement indicates that the headaches 
that Dr. Rohrer was treating were sinus headaches located in his 
face around his nose. He states that this was not the location of 
the headaches that he was having when he began to see Dr. Fenwick 
again. The applicant did have several more physical therapy 
treatments in late July and early August 1994 and then Dr. Fenwich 
referred the applicant to Good Samaritan Hospital for treatment at 
the Pain Clinic by Dr. E. Humphreys. He also referred the 
applicant to Dr. H. Matick, D. 0., apparently for additional 
diagnostic work* 
The applicant was first seen at the Pain Clinic by Dr. 
Humphreys on August 2, 1994. On that date, Dr. Humphreys noted 
frontal occipital headaches and severe neck and shoulder pain. It 
is noted that the applicant could not tolerate driving or lifting 
and had to quit his sales job, because even minor lifting and 
turning of his head and shoulders caused intolerable pain. It is 
noted that even laying down did not help his symptoms at that 
point, with darvocet and toradol making the pain barely tolerable. 
It is also noted that the applicant had not had any active physical 
therapy to that point. The conclusion was that the applicant had 
significant myofacial syndrome and that trigger point injections 
might ameliorate a large majority of the symptoms. The injections 
offered on that date (trigger point injections to the lower neck 
and upper back and bilateral greater occipital nerve blocks) 
apparently resulted in at least initial significant pain reduction. 
Dr. Humphreys also refilled the applciant's toradol and darvocet on 
that day. The injections were repeated one week later, on August 
9, 1994, with an indication in the record that the symptoms were 
less bothersome after the first set of injections. When Dr. 
Fenwick saw the applicant in follow-up on August 11, 1994, he noted 
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that it was his impression that the injections were helping the 
headaches, reducing their severity and that he would continue the 
applicants off-work status for another 6 weeks while the applicant 
continued with the injections. 
On August 15, 1994, the applicant saw Dr. H. Matick, D. 0., 
who apparently specializes in neurological diagnostic work. Dr. 
Matick's August 15, 1994 letter to Dr. Fenwick indicates that he 
wanted to rule out an intracranial mass as a cause of the headaches 
and wanted to rule out a herniated cervical disc as well* Dr. 
Matick therefore referred the applicant for an MRI of the brain, an 
MRI of the cervical spine, EMG studies of the upper extremities, 
sleep studies (SSEPs) and he prescribed elavil (an anti-
depressant) . The applicant had his third set of trigger point 
injections and greater occipital nerve blocks on August 16, 1994. 
It was noted that the applicant had received 2-3 days of benefit 
after the last injections. The medical records reflect that the 
results of the diagnostic work recommended by Dr. Matick, D.O. were 
as follows: August 17, 1994 EEG done by Dr. Matick was read as 
normal, EMG studies done at Good Samaritan Hospital on August 22, 
1994 were read as normal for both upper extremities and SSEP 
studies done that same day at the hospital resulted in a reading 
that was compatible with mild peripheral neuropathy affecting both 
upper extremities, MRI of the brain and MRI of the cervical spine 
done on August 23, 1994 at <5ood Samaritan Hospital were both read 
as unremarkable. 
The applicant had has fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh set 
of trigger point injections and greater occipital nerve blocks at 
Good Samaritan Hospital on August 23, 1994, August 31, 1994, 
September 7, 1994 and September 14, 1994. After all of these 
injections, it was noted that the applicant's overall pain relief 
was at 20%, with some mild improvement in the headaches, but with 
no significant improvement in the neck and upper back pain. Most 
of the notes documenting the injections indicate that Dr. Humphreys 
felt that the injections were not intended to cure the applicant of 
all his pain symptoms and that this was not to be expected. The 
applicant saw Dr. Fenwick again on September 15, 1994 and he 
indicated that the applicant was to remain off work for another 6 
weeks, continuing with the injections. Dr. Matick's letter to Dr. 
Fenwick, dated September 20, 1994, indicates that he simply 
recommended continued medications, with an increase in the elavil 
dosage, continued flexeril, an increase in darvocet usage and a 
decrease in the toradol. After the applicant's eighth set of 
trigger point injections and greater occipital nerve blocks on 
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September 21, 1994, Dr. Humphreys noted that there was a 30-35% 
overall improvement and he noted that he anticipated eventually 
trying the applicant in a work hardening program. 
At some point, the carrier apparently sought out the 
services of Intracorp, a private vocational rehabilitation firm 
with offices all over the country. Apparently, Intracorp was 
requested to assist in the oversight of the applicant's treatment 
so as to manage and assist in returning the applicant to work. A 
September 25, 1994 report of Intracorp indicates that it was the 
impression of the case worker that the trigger point injections 
that the applicant was receiving were not providing any relief at 
all. The report indicates that it was the intention of the case 
worker to send the medical information to a Dr. Yelton for his 
review and that the applicant was to be scheduled for an 
examination by Dr. Yelton. The applicant did have an examination 
performed by Dr. Yelton on October 5, 1994, after he received 2 
additional series of trigger point injections on September 28, 1994 
and October 5, 1994. After these injections, it was noted that the 
applicant felt that he was having less frequent (only once or twice 
per week) and less severe headaches and was 30-40% improved. 
Dr. Yelton/s October 5, 1994 report summarizes the 
applicant's industrial accident and injuries and the treatment and 
diagnostic work that he had had to date. In his report, Dr. Yelton 
concludes that the applicant had chronic cervical and 
scapulothoracic strain. He noted that the applicant'& headaches 
were consistent with this diagnosis and were a result of chronic 
muscle tightness in the cervical muscles. Dr. Yelton explains that 
this explains why the headaches had a delayed onset. With respect 
to the treatment that the applicant was having at that time 
(including the trigger point injections, muscle relaxants and 
elavil) Dr. Yelton found these to be appropriate and he recommended 
continuance of the treatment. He noted that he also recommended 
adding heat and massage and stretching/strengthening exercises. He 
noted that he felt a slow recovery should be anticipated and he 
found that the applicant had not yet reached maximum medical 
improvement and thus was not yet ready for a permanent impairment 
rating. 
The applicant continued with his weekly trigger point 
injections and greater occipital nerve blocks. He had his eleventh 
through his fourteenth set of injections on October 12, 1994, 
October 19, 1994, October 26, 1994 and November 2, 1994. Per the 
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accompanying pain clinic notes of Dr. Humphreys, the applicant 
remained at 30-40% overall improved after these injections. Dr. 
Humphreys also noted that it was safe to say that the applicant 
would not be able to ever return to heavy work, but that it was 
unclear if he would be released to return to some kind of 
functional employment at some point. 
On November 3, 1994, Dr. Yelton wrote the carrier apparently 
responding to some questions that the carrier had with respect to 
his conclusions. , He reiterates in this letter that he felt that 
the applicant's headaches were not related to his sinus condition 
and were related to chronic cervical and scapulothoracic strain. 
He reiterated that a "delayed presentation11 for the headaches was 
not inconsistent. He restated his conclusion that the pain clinic 
referral and treatment was appropriate for chronic pain syndrome, 
which diagnosis he found was common in association with chronic 
cervical/scapulothoracic strain. He states in his letter that he 
felt that the frequency of the trigger point injections should be 
at the discretion of the treating physician. Apparently in 
response to a question regarding the lack of objective physical 
findings in the diagnostic studies obtained by Dr. Matick, Dr. 
Yelton responds that the lack of objective findings and failure to 
confirm radiculopathy, per the MRI, CT and neurological testing, 
did not rule out problems of a muscular nature in the neck and 
upper back, which he found was the source of the applicant's pain. 
The applicant saw Dr. Fenwick again on November 7, 1994 for 
follow-up and he kept the applicant off work, recommended continued 
injection therapy and referred the applicant to Good Samaritan 
Hospital for a functional capacity evaluation (FCE). The FCE was 
done on November 8, 1994 and notes that the applicant described his 
pain level to be a 10 out of a possible 10. It notes that the 
applicant had gained 30 pounds since the date of injury and that he 
was under a 10-pound lifting restriction, per the applicant. The 
conclusion of the evaluator was simply that it was recommended that 
the applicant undergo a therapeutic and conditioning program with 
specified work hardening goals to be achieved in 4 weeks. 
The applicant got 8 additional series of trigger point 
injections and greater occipital nerve blocks on November 9, 1994, 
November 16, 1994, December 14, 1994, December 21, 1994, December 
29, 1994, January 4, 1995, February 8, 1995 and February 23, 1995. 
On December 8, 1994, when the applicant saw Dr. Fenwick for the 
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last time, Dr. Fenwick noted that he felt that the applicant did 
not need to continue seeing him and that Dr. Humphreys at the pain 
clinic could manage his care at that point. Notes accompanying the 
pain clinic treatment indicate up and down improvement and 
worsening of both the headaches and neck/upper back pain, depending 
on the weather and some aggravation" caused by the physical therapy 
that was apparently begun again in November of 1994 (no actual 
records for this reinstituted therapy are included in the medical 
record exhibit) . The pain clinic notes indicate that the applicant 
continued to need "opioids11 to manage his pain, in addition to the 
injections. After the eighteenth in the series of injections, on 
December 21, 1994, Dr. Humphreys noted that the applicant was 
approaching a plateau. Dr. Humphreys experimented with adding 
dexamethasone and prednisone to the injection therapy in late 
December and early January and with a cervical epidural in February 
of 1995. He switched from a weekly regimen to a bi-weekly regimen 
in February 1995. The last pain clinic note is dated February 23, 
1995 and indicates that the applicant had taken some time off 
physical therapy and was returning to it at that time. Dr. 
Humphreys noted at that time that he still did not see a very 
favorable prognosis for the applicant's longterm problems 
associated with the myofascial pain and greater occiptial 
neuralgia. 
Just prior to the* hearing in this case, the carrier 
requested Dr. S. Knorpp to review the applicant's medical records 
and respond to some questions that the carrier had with respect to 
the medical treatment and time off work that the applicant had been 
having in 1994. Dr. Knorrp's report is dated March 3, 1995 and was 
made available to the applicant and his attorney just several days 
before the March 7, 1995 hearing. In his report, Dr. Knorpp 
reviews the records that were made available to him. The listing 
of the records referred to Dr. Knorpp does appear to be fairly 
complete. Dr. Knorpp indicates that he understood that the 
applicant was able to complete his delivery on the date of accident 
and that no traumatic related pathology was indentified at the 
hospital on that date. He notes that he understood that the 
applicant had returned to work from July of 1993 through April of 
1994, during which time he was not required to "provide heavy 
manual materials handling.w 
Dr. Knorpp emphasizes in his report that the applicant's 
headache treatment was initially related to sinusitis in October of 
1993 and that the muscle tension headaches that have been diagnosed 
more recently are not unusual in any given individual. As a 
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result, he states that there is no reason to relate them to the 
motor vehicle accident that took place 16 months before. With 
respect to the diagnostic studies ordered by Dr. Matick, he notes 
that most of these were duplicative and unnecessary. He states 
that the EEG was unnecessary as there was no history of seizures of 
any type. • The MRIs, the SSEP study and the EMG were medically 
unwarranted, per Dr. Knorpp, as there were no symptoms being 
manifested to warrant these diagnostic studies. The MRI of the 
cervical spine alone was possibly warranted to rule out a herniated 
cervical disc, per Dr. Knorpp. With respect to the injections, Dr. 
Knorrp concludes that use of therapeutic injections for chronic 
myofacial pain can be reasonable, if used judiciously (i.e. 
intermittently for pain exacerbation not amenable to other 
treatment) if the individual receiving the injections experiences 
significant and substantial, prolonged benefit from the therapy. 
Dr. Humphrey's use of more than 3 series of injections, where no 
significant lasting improvement was noted, was palliative and 
promoted treatment dependency, per Dr. Knorpp. 
With respect to the period of time off work in 1994 and 
1995, Dr. Knorpp states that there was no need to consider the 
applicant disabled during this period of time based solely on his 
subjective symptomatology. He noted that the November 8, 1994 
functional capacity evaluation did not provide enough information 
on which to base a finding of disability and he noted that the 
evaluator simply restated that he understood that the applicant was 
already under a doctor imposed lifting restriction of no more than 
10 pounds. Dr. Knorpp's recommendations for the applicant were as 
follows: quit smoking, stop injection therapy, start 
aerobic/cardiovascular conditioning, see a doctor experienced in 
chronic pain management (one who recommends maximizing use of anti-
depressants) , quit narcotic, muscle relaxant and anti-inflammatory 
therapy as it has no proven benefit for long-term control of 
myofacial type pain and can be habit forming, get vocational 
rehabilitaion and have a formal functional capacity evaluation to 
objectify his safe work capacities. With respect to the 
applicant's headaches, Dr. Knorpp concluded that there were multi-
factorial in origin, with the cervicothoracic muscle strain 
suffered at the time of the industrial motor vehicle accident being 
a portion of the origin. Nonetheless, Dr. Knorpp states that 
persistent cervicothoracic pain, with or without headaches, is not 
disabling. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The ALJ declines to refer this case to a medical panel and 
finds that the report of Dr. Knorpp is not admissable for the 
purpose of establishing a medical controversy regarding the 
treatment regimen and time off work beginning in July of 1994. The 
problems with Dr. Knorpp's report relate to the procedures followed 
by the carrier in obtaining the report. The procedural problems 
with the report that the ALJ is most concerned with are: 1) the 
failure of Dr. Knorpp to examine the applicant and 2) the fact that 
the report was obtained after the carrier had already obtained one 
second opinion from another physician, who did examine the 
applicant, but whose opinion was not favorable to the carrier. 
Failure to examine the applicant: 
The ALJ feels that the failure to examine the applicant 
creates foundational problems with Dr. Knorpp's conclusions, 
especially considering the fact that all other physicians involved 
in this matter, who offered different opinions from that of Dr. 
Knorrp, did examine the applicant. As noted at hearing, it may be 
that examining the applicant is not always necessary in order for 
the physician to offer a well-founded medical opinion on a 
contested issue. On certain medical issues, examination results 
may be irrelevant. This is sometimes the case with simple 
causation questions. If the question is merely what event 
preciptated the development of a condition or caused an injury to 
occur, the present medical condition of the applicant may be 
irrelevant. However, when the contested issue deals with the 
appropriate treatment advisable, the present medical condition of 
the applicant would seem to be extremely relevant. 
In this case, the appropriate treatment for the applicant's 
condition is the main contested issue. Dr. Knorpp concedes some 
treatment related to the 1993 industrial motor vehicle accident is 
still warranted, he just feels that a different treatment regimen 
than what has been recommended by Dr. Humphreys and Dr. Yelton 
should be followed. However, without examining the applicant, the 
ALJ cannot see how Dr. Knorpp can offer a well-founded opinion 
regarding what treatment is warranted, or not warranted. Certainly 
the well-accepted standard in the medical field is that examination 
of the patient is a pre-requisite to recommending appropriate 
medical care. In addition, with respect to second medical opinions 
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sought by the carrier, the ALJ should note that the Commission rule 
(R578-1-4 (H)) states that the carrier/employer is entitled to an 
"independent medical examination11 (emphasis added) • This suggests 
that one medical report sought by the carrier and based on an 
examination should be admitted. The Commission rules do not 
address reports based on medical* record reviews conducted by 
physicians. As a result, the ALJ sees no inference of 
admissability for these reports in the rules, and it would 
logically follow that these reports should be admissable at the 
discretion of the ALJ, depending on their reliability and their 
relevance to the issue to be decided. Based on the foundational 
concerns noted above, the ALJ declines to admit Dr. Knorpp's record 
review report for purpose of establishing a medical controversy 
regarding the appropriate treatment regimen for the applicant. 
Additional second opinions obtained by the carrier: 
As noted above, the Industrial Commission rules (in 
particular R578-1-4 (H)) allow the carrier the opportunity to have 
the applicant examined by a physician of its choice. The rule 
specifically indicates the right to one second opinion examination. 
The rule was undoubtedly promulgated with recognition that 
differing opinions within the medical community regarding 
causation, advisable treatment and other issues are not uncommon. 
If the second opinion obtained by the employer/carrier conflicts 
with the applicant's treating physician's opinion, then the matter 
is generally sent to a medical panel by the ALJ for additional 
medical input. This process allows for indentification of a 
medical controversy and resolution of that controversy by the ALJ 
after obtaining sufficient medical expert advice. The process is 
generally viewed as a fair and reasonable means of resolving 
medical controversy on contested issues, but the process does add 
considerably to the period of time that the parties spend in 
litigation. Although the Commission has interpreted the rule 
liberally to allow the employer/carrier to obtain additional second 
opinions when new issues arise over the course of managing a claim 
on a given industrial accident, in order to prevent the necessity 
of sending every medical issue on every case to a medical panel and 
thereby increasing the nuiaber of cases involving lengthy, complex 
litigation, the Commission has not allowed the carrier/employer 
more than one second opinion on a given issue. 
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If the Commission were to allow for more than one second 
opinion on a given issue, the next question would be, if two were 
allowed, why not three or four. In essence, this would allow the 
carrier/employer to keep getting additional medical opinions until 
it got one that supported the least-costly alternative for the 
employer/carrier, forcing the applicant to go through Commission 
litigation and a medical panel referral in every case where the 
carrier did not like the opinion of the treating physician on a 
given issue. The ALJ finds that interpreting the Commission rule 
this liberally creates unnecessarily lengthy litigation heavily 
weighted in favor of the party that can afford to keep getting 
additional medical opinions. Considering the undesirable 
consequenecs that would follow, the ALJ can see no reason why the 
Commission rule should be interpreted this liberally. The ALJ 
finds that it is more logical and fair to limit the 
employer/carrier to one second opinion evaluation on any one given 
major medical issue. This allows for each party to offer an 
opinion supportive of its posiiton, without providing one party 
with an unfair advantage over the other. 
The instant case is illustrative of a situation where the 
carrier was seeking a medical opinion that provided for a less-
costly means of managing the applicant's claim. When the initial 
second opinion of Dr. Yelton was not supportive of a less-costly 
regimen of treatment, the carrier sought out a third opinion. The 
carrier<s cost-containment concerns in this case are further 
emphasized by the carrier's reluctance to pay travel expenses for 
the applicant to come to Utah for the third-opinion examination. 
Although the ALJ can understand that the carrier has cost-
containment concerns, the Commission cannot be in the position of 
interpreting its procedural rules to assist one party in addressing 
its- concerns (i.e. by admitting an unlimited number of medical 
opinion reports, even if they are not well-founded) while ignoring 
the concerns of the opposing party. The carrier also noted at 
hearing that it had many problems trying to manage the applicant7s 
claim, as he resides outside of Utah, and the carrier noted regrets 
in hiring Intracorp to oversee the applicant's treatment regimen, 
as in retrospect, Intracorp chose a physician that ended up merely 
agreeing with the treating physician's lengthy and costly treatment 
regimen. Once again, the Commission cannot take the carrier's case 
managment problems into account in deciding how it should interpet 
the litigation procedure rules in any given case. The most fair 
way to interpret the Coiamission mile regarding employer/carrier 
sought second opinions is to allow just one second opinion 
examination at a time. 
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Based on the foregoing discussion, the ALJ feels she must 
refuse to admit the opinion of Dr. Knorpp, as poorly founded and 
improperly obtained per Commission rule. Based on the opinions of 
Dr. Humphreys and Dr. Yelton, it appears that the treatment regimen 
offered at least through the end of 1994 was reasonably medically 
necessary as a result of the industrial accident of March 15, 1993. 
Dr. Fenwick and Dr. Humphreys appear to indicate that the applicant 
remained medically unstable at least through the end of 1994 and 
thus the ALJ will award medical expenses and temporary total 
compensation (TTC) through December 31, 1994. The medical record 
exhibit has very little medical information for 1995, but the ALJ 
notes that, by February of 1995, Dr. Humphreys was spacing out the 
injections more and was indicating his feeling that he did not 
anticipate the applicant improving significantly in the future. It 
appears therefore that the applicant was approaching medical 
stability at that point. The ALJ will not try to pick a point of 
medical stability after of January 1, 1995, because of the minimal 
information for 1995 that the ALJ has before her. The ALJ hopes 
that the parties will be able to come to an agreement on a date of 
medical stability in 1995. If an agreement cannot be reached, 
updated medical information can be submitted and the ALJ will 
reopen the matter for consideration of the medical stability issue. 
At this point, the ALJ will simply award benefits through December 
31, 1994 and leave the period thereafter to be settled by the 
parties or litigated in the future, if necessary. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, Stampede 
Trucking, Inc./Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay the 
applicant, John R. Kimball, temporary total compensation at the 
rate of $167.00 per week, for 23.286 weeks, or $3,888.76, for the 
period of medical instability associated with the March 15, 1993 
industrial accident, from July 22, 1994 through December 31, 1994. 
That amount is accrued and due and payable in a lump sum, plus 
interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78, and less the attorney 
fees to be awarded below. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Stampede Trucking, 
Inc./Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay all medical expenses 
incurred as the result of the March 15, 1993 industrial accident, 
including the expenses incurred for the treatment offered during 
the period of July 22, 1994 through December 31, 1994; said 
expenses to be paid in accordance with the medical and surgical fee 
schedule of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Stampede Trucking, 
Inc./Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay T. Jeffery Cottle, 
attorney for the applicant, the sum of $777.75, plus 20% of the 
interest payable on the award, per Commission rule R568-1-7, for 
services.rendered in this matter, the same to be deducted from the 
aforesaid award to the applicant, and to be remitted directly to 
the office of T. Jeffery CQttle. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject tq review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is 
timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the 
date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written 
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b-
12(2) Utah Code Annotated. 
DATED this(^' day of April, 1995. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
rx^^Q 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on April (^  , 1995
 f a copy of the attached 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the case of John 
R. Kimball, was mailed to the following persons at the following 
addresses, postage paid: 
John R. Kimball 
107 Navaho Drive 
Vincennes, IN 47591 
T. Jeffery Cottle 
Attorney at Law 
387 West Center Street 
Orem, UT 84058 
Carrie Taylor 
Attorney at Law 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
P O Box 57929 
SLC, UT 84157-0929 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
UO^J^YX^ K^\suyAj->/„ £^-Wilma Burrows 
Adjudication Division 
00270 
Exhibit B 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DECISION 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
•JOHN R, KIMBALL, * 
Applicant, * ORDER DENYING 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
vs. * 
* 
STAMPEDE TRUCKING and WORKERS * 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, * Case No. 94-0967 
# 
Defendants. * 
Stampede Trucking and The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
(referred to jointly as "Stampede") ask The Industrial Commission 
of Utah to review the Administrative Law Judge's award of benefits 
to John R. Kimball pursuant to the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this 
motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utan Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUES UNDER REVIEW 
Stampede raises the following issues in its motion for review: 
1) Is Dr. Knorpp's report admissible as evidence in this 
proceeding? 2) Should the ALJ have referred Mr. Kimball's claim to 
a medical panel? 3) Are the ALJ's findings and conclusions 
sufficient? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Industrial Commission adopts the ALJ's exhaustive 
recitation of the subsidiary facts regarding Mr. Kimball's claim. 
The Industrial Commission's file provides additional information on 
the procedural aspects of this case. The facts material to this 
motion for review are summarized below: 
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On March 15, 1993, Mr. Kimball was in a traffic accident while 
working for Stampede. He received medical treatment for various 
injuries, including neck and upper back strain. He returned to 
work during August 1993. Stampede paid workers' compensation 
benefits arising from Mr. Kimball's accident. 
Several months later, Mr. Kimball began suffering severe 
headaches. During July 1994, on instruction from his physician, 
Mr. Kimball left work and commenced an additional course of medical 
treatment. Mr. Kimball then requested additional workers' 
compensation benefits from Stampede on the theory that his 
continuing medical complaints were caused by his prior industrial 
accident. Mr. Kimball's claim was supported by the medical 
opinions of his treating physicians. 
Stampede denied Mr. Kimball's claim and employed Dr. Yelton to 
perform what is commonly referred to as an *independent medical 
evaluation" (WIME") of Mr. Kimball's medical condition. In the 
meantime, Mr. Kimball submitted an application for hearing to the 
Industrial Commission. 
On October 5, 1994, Dr. Yelton submitted his report to 
Stampede. Dr. Yelton concurred with Mr. Kimball's treating 
physicians that Mr. Kimball's continuing medical problems were due 
to his prior industrial accident. Dr. Yelton also concluded that 
Mr. Kimball's medical care was reasonably necessary. 
On November 1, 1994, the Industrial Commission's Adjudication 
Division instructed Stampede to answer Mr. Kimball'-s application 
for hearing. Stampede did so on November 14, 1994,^ generally 
denying liability. On January 3# 1995, the Adjudication Division 
scheduled Mr. Kimball's claim for hearing on March 7, 1995. 
On February 27, 1995, Stampede employed Dr. Knorpp to review 
Mr. Kimball's medical records. Dr. Knorpp's report was not 
submitted to opposing counsel until 4:37 p.m. on March 6, 1995, the 
day before the hearing. The report was not included in Stampede's 
medical exhibit. At no time did Stampede request a continuance of 
the hearing. 
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At the hearing on Mr. Kimball's claim, Stampede offered Dr. 
Knorpp's report into evidence. The ALJ refused to accept the 
report on the grounds it lacked foundation and contravened 
Industrial Commission rules. The ALJ also denied Stampede's 
request that Mr. Kimball's claim be referred to a medical panel. 
The ALJ ultimately ruled that Mr. Kimball's continuing medical 
problems were the result of his industrial accident, that his 
medical care through 1994 was necessary to treat his industrial 
injuries, and that Mr. Kimball was entitled to the requested 
medical benefits and disability compensation, also through 1994. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Stampede argues: 1) the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Knorpp's 
report; 2) The ALJ erred in not appointing a medical panel; and 3) 
The ALJ's findings and conclusions are insufficient. The 
Industrial Commission will address each of these issues. 
I. Dr. Knorpp's report. 
The ALJ expressed two reasons for rejecting Dr. Knorpp's 
report. The first reason was that because Dr. Knorpp was not given 
an opportunity to personally examine Mr. Kimball, the report lacked 
sufficient foundation to warrant admission as evidence. 
While the Industrial Commission would not have rejected the 
report in question solely because Dr. Knorpp did not personally 
examine Mr. Kimball, the Industrial Commission agrees with the ALJ 
that the persuasive force of the report is severely diminished for 
that reason* Thus, even if the report had been admitted, it would 
be entitled to very little weight. 
The ALJ's second reason for rejecting Dr. Knorpp's report 
relates to the Industrial Commission's Rule R568-1-4.H: 
. . . The defendant may also require the applicant to 
submit to an independent medical examination to be 
conducted by a physician of the defendant's choice. 
i ^ *^/::*<£» 
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The ALJ interpreted the foregoing rule as limiting Stampede to 
only one IME. The ALJ reasoned that since Stampede had previously 
obtained an IME from Dr. Yelton, it could not submitted a second 
report from Dr. Knorpp. 
In the Industrial Commission's view, Rule R568-1-4.H does not 
control the admissibility of Dr. Knorpp's report. Instead, the 
rule only explains and limits an applicant's duty to cooperate with 
IME's on behalf of defendants. The rule does not limit the 
admissibility of other medical evidence, such as Dr. Knorpp's 
report. Consequently, Rule R568-1-4.H does not support the ALJ's 
rejection of Dr. Knorpp's report. 
While not adopting the ALJ's specific reasons for rejecting 
Dr. Knorpp's report, the Industrial Commission nevertheless 
concludes that under the circumstances of this case, the report is 
inadmissible because the Industrial Commission's Rule R568-1-4.J 
required Stampede to file all medical records at least one week 
prior to the hearing. Dr. Knorpp's report, which was not filed 
until the time of the hearing, did not comply with Rule R568-1-4.J. 
The Industrial Commission's rules are not intended or applied 
to deprive parties of reasonable opportunity to present their 
cases. However, in this case Stampede failed to take timely steps 
to gather its evidence and as a consequence was unable to meet the 
disclosure requirements set forth in the Industrial Commission's 
rules. In particular, even though Stampede knew in October 1994 
that the report it had obtained from Dr. Yelton was unfavorable, 
Stampede did not commission Dr. Knorpp's report until only eight 
days prior to the hearing. The report was not completed until five 
days prior to hearing and Stampede did not provide a copy to 
opposing counsel until the eve of the hearing. The ALJ did not 
receive the report until the hearing itself. Furthermore, Stampede 
did not request that the hearing be continued to allow for proper 
disclosure of the report. 
Under these circumstances, the Industrial Commission finds no 
basis for excusing Stampede from the requirements of Rule R568-1-
4.J. The Industrial Commission therefore concludes that Dr. 
Knorpp's report is inadmissible. 
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II. Referral to a medical panel. 
Stampede contends the ALJ should have referred Mr. Kimball's 
claim to a medical panel for review. Section 35-1-77 of the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act grants the Industrial Commission 
discretion to convene medical panels. The Industrial Commission 
exercises such discretion according to its Rule R568-1-9, which 
provides in material part as follows: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law 
Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be 
shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(c) medical expenses in controversy amounting to 
more than $2,000. 
In this case, Dr. 'Knorpp's report is the only support for 
Stampede's claim that a significant medical issue exists. For 
reasons discussed above, Dr. Knorpp's report has not been accepted 
as evidence in this matter. All other medical evidence indicates 
that the medical treatment in question has been reasonable and 
necessary. The Industrial Commission therefore concludes that no 
significant medical issue exists and that no medical panel is 
necessary. 
III. Sufficiency of the ALJ's findings and decision. 
Stampede contends the ALJ failed to address the following 
issues: 1) What was the condition for which Mr. Kimball was being 
treated during July, 1994 forward? 2) Was the condition medically 
causally related to the industrial accident of March 15, 1993? 3) 
Was the treatment rendered reasonable and medically necessary? 4) 
Was the Applicant temporarily totally disabled from July 22, 1994 
forward as a direct result of the industrial injury? 
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The foregoing questions are answered in any fair reading of 
the ALJ's decision, but for purposes of clarity, the Industrial 
Commission finds and concludes as follows:* Since July 1994, Mr. 
Kimball has been treated for frontal occipital headaches, severe 
neck and shoulder pain, and myofacial syndrome . Such conditions 
were medically caused by the industrial accident of March 15, 1993. 
The treatment rendered on behalf of Mr. Kimball through 1994 was 
reasonable and medically necessary. Mr. Kimball was temporarily 
totally disabled after July 22, 1994 until at least January 1, 
1995. 
ORDER 
The Industrial Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and 
denies Stampede's motion for review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this o<7 day of September, 1995. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this 
order by filing a request for reconsideration with the Commission 
within 20 days of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party 
may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a 
petition for review with that court within 30 days of the date of 
this order. 
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